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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are 14 professors of law who have
devoted much of their teaching and research to the
area of state taxes and the role of state tax policy in
our federal system. The names and affiliations (for
identification purposes only) of amici are included in
an addendum to this brief.1 The amici are concerned
with the effect of this Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence on the development of fair and
efficient state tax systems. No decision of this Court
has had more effect on state sales and use tax systems than Quill Corporation v. North Dakota. We
believe the Tenth Circuit properly decided the case
below. But if the Court decides to grant the Direct
Marketing Association’s petition to review the issue
of discrimination which it raises, we respectfully request that the Court also grant the conditional crosspetition filed by Executive Director Barbara J. Brohl
of the Colorado Department of Revenue asking the
Court to reconsider Quill. This brief sets forth the
reasons for our support of that cross-petition.

1No

counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part
nor made any monetary contribution. Only amici curiae or
their counsel made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for the parties
received timely notice of the intent to file this brief and have
granted consent.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of
State of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), this Court held,
over a rigorous dissent, that Illinois could not constitutionally require a mail-order seller with no office,
agents, solicitors or property in the state to collect
use taxes on its sales. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the Court reconsidered this
holding. North Dakota did not allege that Quill was
factually distinguishable from Bellas Hess. See Quill,
504 U.S at 303. Instead, the state took on the harder
task of arguing that changes in the Court’s Due Process and Commerce Clause jurisprudence had made
Bellas Hess obsolete. Id. at 303-04. The Court agreed
with North Dakota that both its Due Process and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence had “evolved substantially.” Quill, 504 U.S at 307, 309.
But the Court nevertheless overruled Bellas Hess
only on Due Process Clause grounds. The Court not
only sustained Bellas Hess under the Commerce
Clause, but also breathed new life into its holding—
creating what is now referred to as the “physical
presence” nexus standard for use tax collection. This
result can only be explained by the Court’s desire to
remove due process obstacles to Congressional intervention while protecting the interests of the mailorder industry under the Commerce Clause. These
concerns led to an unprecedented bifurcation of the
standard for state tax jurisdiction or “nexus” between the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, a
distinction that has not been extended to other areas
but has instead become a “precedential island.” See
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Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151
(10th Cir. 2016)(“DMA II”)(Gorsuch, J. concurring).
For more than two decades, states like Colorado
have endeavored without success to adapt the necessities of sales and use tax enforcement to the physical presence standard, especially in a digital world.
Now some states are considering another direct challenge, this time to Quill. 2 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
has stated that the legal system should find the appropriate case to consider a challenge to Quill. See
Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135
(2015)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“DMA I”). This
Court’s precedents are not “sacrosanct;” rather, they
can be overruled where “the necessity and propriety
of doing so has been established,” Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), especially when they have become anachronistic, Quill
504 U.S. at 331 (White, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
We leave it to others to expound the ways in
which the physical presence standard has proven to
be unworkable. Dozens of scholarly articles have addressed the topic. 3 For our part, we contend the
John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, 81 STATE TAX
NOTES 695 (Aug. 29, 2016).
3 See, e.g., John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, supra;
H. Beau Baez, Taxing Internet Sales: Trying to Make a TwoThousand-Year-Old Jurisdiction Test Work in the Dot-Com
Economy, 64 TAX LAW. 807 (2011) William Joel Kolarik, II, Untangling Substantial Nexus, 64 TAX LAW. 851 (2011); Richard
D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65
AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2016); Walter Hellerstein, Taxing Remote
Sales In The Digital Age: A Global Perspective, 65 AM. U. L.
REV. 1195 (2016).
2
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standard has no support under established constitutional principles. If the Court chooses to grant the
DMA’s petition in this case, it should also grant Colorado’s conditional cross-petition to reconsider Quill.
ARGUMENT
I. The result in Quill appears attributable to
an elevated concern for the mail-order industry’s reliance interests, faith that the
physical presence standard would be workable, and an expectation that Congress
would intervene legislatively to address any
problems.
Because the Quill Court was not writing on a
clean slate, it sustained the Commerce Clause holding in Bellas Hess to accommodate certain concerns,
creating a physical presence standard as the “nexus”
requirement for use tax collection. In doing so, it elevated the mail-order industry’s reliance interests
over other competing interests, disregarding the
sound constitutional principles which the opinions in
Quill recognize. The Court’s rationale also reflected
faith that the physical presence standard would, at
least, be workable, and if not, the expectation that
Congress would change it.
A. The opinions in Quill reflect elevated
concerns for the mail-order industry’s
reliance interests compounded by
questions regarding the retroactive
effect of overruling Bellas Hess.
Whether a decision to overrule Bellas Hess should
be given retroactive effect was the “800-pound goril-
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la” in Quill. Quill’s petition for writ of certiorari had
set forth the issue as a separate question from
whether Bellas Hess remained good law. (“Whether
the North Dakota Supreme Court may give retroactive effect to its decision, which is contrary to established constitutional precedent, to make Quill liable
for uncollected use taxes back to July 1, 1987?”) The
Court did not grant certiorari on that issue, Quill,
504 U.S at 332 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, some Justices expressed concerns about retroactivity during oral argument. See Oral Argument, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, No. 91-194, 1992 WL 687848 (Jan. 22, 1992).
The Court’s apparent ambivalence is perhaps understandable. Quill came to the Court amid its reexamination of whether its rulings might be given prospective rather than retroactive effect. See James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991);
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 501 U.S. 1247
(1991)(Harper I); and Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)(Harper II)(where the
Court reconsidered its precedent on prospective application under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97 (1971)). Just a few weeks after Quill, the Court,
citing Beam, noted the “difficult questions” raised
when a precedent is overruled retroactively. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,
785-86 (1992). Under Harper II, the Court held that
its decisions are presumed to have retroactive effect
when applied to the parties before it. 509 U.S. at 97
(1993).
Because the Court did not take up the question of
retroactivity in Quill, North Dakota did not have the
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opportunity to discuss the contours of that doctrine
nor to challenge the legitimacy of the industry’s purported reliance interests including whether leaving
Bellas Hess in place was necessary to accommodate
those interests. The majority in Quill could simply
assert that “it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry's dramatic growth over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from
state taxation created in Bellas Hess,” Quill, 504 U.S
at 316, concluding that the “Bellas Hess rule . . . has
become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry,” Id. at 317 (emphasis added). Justice White’s
partial dissent, in contrast, notes that neither Quill
nor its amici cited any investment decisions that
would have changed had the mail-order industry believed Bellas Hess was no longer the rule. Quill at
331-32.
Contrary to the Court’s assertion in Quill, the
growth of the mail-order industry was likely facilitated by many things, including the advent of national credit cards, such as MasterCard and Visa,
the innovation of the toll-free 800-telephone call, and
the expansion of the United Parcel Service (UPS)
and Federal Express. How much of that growth was
due to the advantage of not having to collect tax is,
at best, a tricky empirical question. Richard D.
Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and
Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2016).
The majority in Quill expressed much less concern for competing interests. Shielding certain
sellers from tax collection obligations would certainly
pose economic drawbacks for competitors required to
collect taxes. Nor did the majority consider the sub-
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stantial tax enforcement problems that would be
created for the states. But most critically, the majority did not address whether it was reasonable for the
mail-order industry to have relied so extensively on
Bellas Hess as to make its holding part of the “foundation” for that industry’s growth. Arguably, such
reliance would have required the rule in Bellas Hess
to be frozen in time.
The Courts in both Bellas Hess and Quill gave no
indication that they expected that a rule designed to
protect the reliance interests of a part of a single industry (mail-order sellers without physical presence)
would come to constitute the rule for an emerging
industry built on the Internet. Should this Court decide to overturn Quill, it can do so while respecting
the reasonable reliance interests of sellers without
physical presence, which extend to avoiding retroactive liabilities for uncollected taxes. Any retroactive
liabilities must have two separate causes—the first
being a decision to overrule Quill, which would be
presumed to have retroactive effect if it were applied
to the parties in this case—but need not be so applied. But the second cause of any retroactive liabilities would be the statutes requiring tax collection
that might spring into effect in many states after the
limitation in Quill is removed. Allowing this kind of
retroactive liability, however, contravenes a longestablished principle that legislative enactments, unlike this Court’s rulings, are presumed to have prospective effect. This presumption is founded in the
Due Process Clause, which provides for fair notice
and repose, interests that may be compromised by
retroactive legislation. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). If the Court were to
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overrule Quill, these same “interests in fair notice”
that underpin this presumption would justify making that ruling prospective. Further, if the Court
found that Quill has become unworkable, holding
that it continues to apply until the point at which it
is adjudicated unworkable, rather than applying it
retroactively, would be consistent with principles of
stare decisis. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991)(“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable
or are badly reasoned, “this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.”).
B. Quill reflects a hope that, despite the
artificial nature of the physical presence standard and its failure to embody constitutional principles, the
standard would at least be a workable
“bright-line” rule.
The Quill Court clearly put its faith in the practical workability of the “bright-line” physical-presence
standard. Our purpose here is not to demonstrate
the many ways in which, with the advent of electronic commerce, this standard has failed to justify that
faith. Instead, we demonstrate that the physicalpresence standard cannot be derived from fundamental constitutional principles, and if it has become
unworkable, it need not be sustained as though it
reflected or embodied those principles.
The majority in Quill defended the physical presence standard as a bright-line test despite admitting
it “appears artificial at its edges.” Quill, 504 U.S at
315. With hindsight, it is obvious that the artificiality of the physical-presence standard extends well

9
beyond “the edges.” Under that standard, a small
business with a few employees in multiple states will
have multiple tax collection obligations, whereas a
much larger Internet seller with no presence in the
same states will not.
It is telling that the three opinions in Quill use
the term “physical presence” a total of 27 times and
the term “bright-line” 15 times. And yet no precedent
cited by the Quill Court, including Bellas Hess, uses
either term. In 1992, the distinction that had been
made in Bellas Hess between mail-order sellers with
instate retail offices versus those without, was simple enough to draw. But there is no evidence the
Court considered the viability of a physical presence
standard going forward. See Quill, 504 U.S at 321
(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)(looking only at the period from 1967 to
1992 for proof that the standard would be workable).
Even less attention was paid to whether the
standard was required by constitutional principles.
This question was raised mainly by the dissents in
Bellas Hess and Quill. To the dissent in Bellas Hess,
the line between mail-order sellers with and without
retail outlets, solicitors, or property was simply not
grounded in the fundamental constitutional principle cited by the majority—that a state could impose
a burden on an out-of-state seller in exchange for the
benefits it provided if the burden did not exceed that
imposed on local commerce. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at
765-66. (Fortas, J., dissenting) And it was undeniable that the burden to be imposed on the mail-order
sellers was no greater than that imposed on other
sellers. Id. at 766. Moreover, that burden was argu-
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ably comparable to other tax and regulatory burdens
that states could continue to impose on mail-order
sellers. See DMA II at 1149 (Gorsuch, J. concurring)(citing Quill, 504 U.S at 311-12).
Justice White, in his partial dissent in Quill, contended that the artificial distinction made in Bellas
Hess between mail-order sellers was no different
than similar formalistic rulings in Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946) and Spector Motor Serv. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1977), which the Court had
abandoned as unworkable and unprincipled. Quill,
504 U.S at 322 (concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice White concluded: “The majority clings
to the physical-presence rule not because of any logical relation to fairness or any economic rationale related to principles underlying the Commerce Clause,
but simply out of the supposed convenience of having
a bright-line rule.” Id. at 329. It was a “sure bet”,
said Justice White that “the vagaries of ‘physical
presence’ will be tested to their fullest in our courts.”
Id. at 331. Although the concurring opinion dismissed these concerns, see Quill, 504 U.S at 320-21
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), they have been vindicated in the Internet
age.
C. Congress’s lack of action on this issue
does not relieve the Court of its responsibility.
By bifurcating the constitutional basis for state
tax jurisdiction (discussed further in Section II) and
removing the due process obstacle to Congressional
intervention, the Court left Congress “free to decide
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whether, when, and to what extent the states may
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to
collect use taxes.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. The
majority admitted this also made its decision easier
saying “[t]his fact alone” was enough to keep it from
overturning Bellas Hess “at least for now.” Id. at
318-19.
The concurring opinion in Quill expressed a similar expectation that Congress could change the rule
of Bellas Hess “by simply saying so.” Id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). The concurrence also justifies this decision, saying: “We have long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have done.’” Id.
As authority for this proposition, however, the concurrence cites decisions upholding the Court’s earlier
construction of federal statutes, rather than cases
involving the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause rulings. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (citing Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173
(1989)(42 U.S.C.A. § 1981), Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991)(the Federal Employers' Liability Act); and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977)(the Clayton and Sherman Acts)).
The idea that the Court may “shift to Congress
the responsibility for perpetuating the Court’s error,”
see Cleveland v. U.S., 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946)
(Rutledge, J. concurring), is problematic. As Justice
Rutledge underscored in Cleveland, there are “vast
differences between legislating by doing nothing and
legislating by positive enactment.” Id. The reasons
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Congress may fail to take corrective action include
the sheer pressure of other more important business,
political considerations, and “a strong and proper
tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own
errors.” Id. at 22-23. Further, according to Justice
Rutledge:
The danger of imputing to Congress, as a result of its failure to take positive or affirmative action through normal legislative processes, ideas entertained by the Court concerning Congress’ will, is illustrated most
dramatically perhaps by the vacillating and
contradictory courses pursued in the long
line of decisions imputing to ‘the silence of
Congress’ varied effects in commerce clause
cases.
Id. (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).4 See
also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997)(Thomas, J. dissenting)(“treating unenacted congressional intent as
if it were law would be constitutionally dubious”).

After Quill, Congress expressed little interest in legislation addressing this issue until the Senate passed the Marketplace Fairness Act in 2013. That proposal languished in the House and was
never enacted. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th
Cong. (2013) GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/s743 (last visited May 17, 2016). The bill has been reintroduced in the Senate and referred to Committee. Marketplace
Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senatebill/698/related-bills (last visited May 17, 2016) (providing the
status of legislation pending in Congress). Similar legislation
was introduced in the House but never voted on.
4
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These points are as true today as when Justice
Rutledge expressed them.
Today, Congress would face additional hurdles in
enacting legislation overruling Quill: divergent and
competing business interests, conflicting state interests, and the mistaken view by many consumers that
Internet sales are simply “tax free” and that any tax
collected would be tantamount to a “new” tax. Congress may be unable to act even if a majority favors
eliminating the physical presence rule. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for
the Supreme Court to Overrule Quill, 82 BROOK. L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2017),
available
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844470 (last visited Oct.
28, 2016).
II. To uphold Bellas Hess, the Quill Court took
the unprecedented step of bifurcating the
standard for state tax jurisdiction, or “nexus.”
This Section examines Quill’s unprecedented bifurcation of the standard for state tax jurisdiction, or
“nexus,” between the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses. This was a controversial idea, as acknowledged by Judge Gorsuch below, who described Quill
in these terms: “Everyone before us acknowledges
that Quill is among the most contentious of all
dormant commerce clause cases. Everyone before us
acknowledges that it’s been the target of criticism
over many years from many quarters, including from
many members of the Supreme Court.” DMA II, 814
F.3d at 1148 (concurring opinion).
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No dispute exists that the Commerce Clause imposes limitations on state taxing powers in addition
to what the Due Process Clause imposes. See Quill,
504 at 305. Prior to Quill, however, the Court had
little reason to precisely distinguish whether its rulings on state nexus were grounded in one clause or
the other. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v.
Dep’t of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560, 562, 564
(1975)(referencing both the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)(the “two
claims are closely related”). In any case, while the
nexus standard might be based in both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, the Court never held
that the standard would not be the same under both
clauses. See, e.g. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554 (1977)(stating that:
“The question presented by this case is whether the
Society’s activities at the offices in California provided sufficient nexus . . . as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause”); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 304
(describing Bellas Hess as relying on both the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause).
Bifurcating and distinguishing the nexus standard between the Due Process Clause, which Quill
satisfied, and the Commerce Clause, which Quill did
not, served two purposes. By holding that Quill had
nexus under the Due Process Clause, the Court removed the constitutional obstacle to Congress’s intervention by negating any due process right of “remote” vendors to be free of state use tax collection
duties. At the same time, however, because Quill had
no Commerce Clause nexus, it could not be made to

15
collect the North Dakota use tax. This protected the
mail order industry’s perceived reliance interests.
This approach of creating a different nexus
standard under the Due Process Clause from that
under the Commerce Clause was unprecedented,
and it came at a high jurisprudential cost. The Court
sought support for its approach in one case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289
(1977), and that case’s single use of the term “substantial nexus.” Complete Auto was a Commerce
Clause case and, according to the Quill Court, the
use of “substantial nexus,” as opposed to just “nexus,” supported a different meaning under the Commerce Clause than under the Due Process Clause. As
leading scholars observed, “the Court’s discovery
that ‘[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses are not identical’ is more accurately viewed
as a doctrinal epiphany than as a logical inference to
be drawn from the careful reading of its precedents.”
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02 (3d ed. 2012). Ironically, in Complete Auto, the question of the nexus
standard was not even before the Court because the
taxpayer acknowledged that it was not challenging
nexus. Complete Auto at 276-78. Anything the Court
might have said about nexus was merely dicta.
Also, standing in contrast to Complete Auto’s
one-time use of “substantial nexus” was the Court’s
reference to “sufficient nexus” or “sufficiently connected” elsewhere in the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 278,
285. Additionally, Complete Auto cites cases referring to nexus in more traditional due process con-
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texts as a “necessary connection,” id. at 280-81 (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 271 (1946)
(Rutledge, J., concurring), or as “sufficient nexus,”
id. at 285 (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)). Complete Auto’s
one-time use of “substantial nexus” in a case not involving nexus can hardly be read as announcing a
new Commerce Clause meaning for the concept. Indeed, the term “substantial nexus” never appears in
a tax context prior to Complete Auto and had no history attached to it. And in Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v.
Cal. Bd. of Equalization, decided less than a month
after Complete Auto, the Court stated:
The question presented by this case is
whether the Society’s activities at the offices
in California provided sufficient nexus between the out-of-state seller appellant and
the [s]tate—as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause—to support the imposition upon the Society of a use-tax-collection
liability.
430 U.S. 551, 554 (1977)(emphasis added). In short,
it is difficult to believe that the one-time use of the
term “substantial nexus” in Complete Auto can bear
the weight Quill put on that term. See also Richard
D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess,
and Quill, supra, at 1145-47.
Moreover, formulating a new nexus standard
based on traditional Commerce Clause principles
alone is fraught with difficulty. As noted in Section I,
the Quill Court never explained why a company’s
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physical presence in a state is related to the Commerce Clause value of limiting state burdens on interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-15. According to the majority in Quill, the Commerce Clause
and the substantial nexus requirement reflect structural concerns about the effects of state regulation
on the national economy and interstate commerce.
Id. at 311-13. Yet the majority fails to explain in
what way the burden on interstate commerce of collecting the use tax is reduced when a mail-order
seller has property in the state, see Nat’l Geographic
Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562
(1977) (a company’s office in the market state soliciting advertisements for the company’s magazine
“provide[d] a sufficient nexus” between the company
and the market state), or when a seller has engaged
the services of ten part-time, independent contractors within the state, see Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362
U.S. 207, 211, 213 (1960). See Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, supra, at 1144. And while Justice Rutledge had suggested in his Freeman concurrence that the requirement of some local incident might act as a safeguard
to multiple or duplicative taxation, 329 U.S. at 260261, that issue has now been addressed under Complete Auto’s “fair apportionment” prong, see Goldberg
v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1989).
Neither in Complete Auto, nor in any other case
cited by Quill, has the Court found sufficient contacts for due process purposes but an insufficient
nexus under the Commerce Clause. Quill, 504 U.S.
at 325 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part). And not since Quill has the Court seen a
need to have a different nexus standard under the
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Due Process and Commerce Clauses. Moreover, the
lower courts have generally interpreted Quill narrowly, even in the state tax context. See John A.
Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 321 (2003)(chronicling how the physical presence standard was not adopted in the corporate income tax context and the policy and other reasons
for distinguishing Quill).
As Judge Gorsuch noted in his concurrence in
DMA II, “[i]t may be rare for Supreme Court precedents to suffer as highly a ‘distinguished’ fate . . .”
DMA II, 814 F.3d at 1150. But the explanation for
that fate is simple: Quill adds nothing substantive to
the constitutional framework that undergirds state
tax nexus. As a decision resulting from expediency,
Quill cannot be sustained on principle.
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CONCLUSION
In 2015, Justice Kennedy described Quill as
“questionable even when decided” and said it “should
be left in place only if a powerful showing can be
made that its rationale is still correct.” DMA I, 135
S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (concurring opinion). As we have
argued here, the rationale for Quill was one driven
entirely by practical concerns, rather than constitutional principles. Justice Kennedy also expressed the
view that “[t] he legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and
Bellas Hess.” Id. If the Court determines it is necessary to accept the DMA’s petition for certiorari, it
should not wait to reexamine Quill in some later
case, but should accept Colorado’s cross-petition.
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